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This working paper shows China’s technological advance, its basis in using foreign 
technology combined with its own manpower resources, and its clever integration of 
regional ambitions with national policies and programs. It also indicates an emerging 
global rivalry as China moves towards a future status as technological superpower. 
 
In any attempt to understand recent and future industrial and economic development in 
China it becomes unavoidable to think about its various regions as the equivalents of 
major countries in other parts of the world. In several ways the regions of the Pearl River 
Delta, the Yangtze River Delta and the Bo-Hai Rim, including Beijing, can be compared 
with France, Germany and the UK in Europe. By world standard the regions essentially 
have middle-income purchasing power. 
 
The US in the early part of this century remains unchallenged in defense, economics, 
politics and technology. Japan can be termed a superpower in economics and technology. 
EU is conceived as a superpower in economics, politics and technology, while Russia has 
remaining strengths in defense and technology. Today China is a superpower in politics 
with an emergence in economics and great ambitions in technology. 
 
China has during the past ten years dramatically increased the number of students in 
tertiary education and provided more funding for R&D, not only in absolute terms but 
also in relation to its GDP. Traditional indicators, such as patents, still suggest that China 
is far from reaching its goal of becoming a knowledge-based economy. However, 
monitoring signs of dynamic changes within industrial sectors and emerging 
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Chinese companies as global players 
 
In late April 2004 a Chinese company, TCL Communication with its origin 1981 in 
Guizhou in South China, and Alcatel in France signed an agreement to combine their 
mobile handset resources into a joint venture company. The JV will include research and 
development, sales and distribution of mobile phone handsets and related products and 
services. The formation of the JV involves contributions with 55 million euros by TCL 
Communication and 45 million euros by Alcatel, thus TCL being the major shareholder 
that expects the partner to provide a platform to rapidly expand international business. 
 
TCL started as a manufacturer of tape recorders and became reorganized after having 
coped with a financial crisis in 1986 and developed into an important trader in TV sets 
and subsequently listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1993. In 2000 TCL started 
new production lines for TV sets and entered into mobile handsets the following year. In 
2002 the TCL Group invited strategic investors from abroad and made important changes 
in its management structure. 
 
Alcatel has through its acquisition of the ITT partnership in the Shanghai Bell 
telecommunications company been a pioneer in providing advanced digital switches to 
China. The present Alcatel owes its origin to a company that was started in 1888 as a 
general electrical equipment factor, CGE, to follow the trails of Siemens in Germany and 
General Electric in the US. The company is now specialized in telecommunications with 
                                                 
1 This Working Paper has been prepared while being Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian 
Institute in Singapore during the summer of 2004. I am very grateful for having been invited to prepare a 
book manuscript for which this WP represents an early and partial outline for a book that carries the same 
title – to be published in 2005. I also want to express my appreciation to Professor Denis Simon of the 
Renssaeler Polytechnic Institute for his intellectual support for some of the concepts that are discussed. 
Furthermore I am very grateful to Dr Krystyna Palonka, of the European Institute of Japanese Studies at the 
Stockholm School of Economics, who tirelessly  and without losing interest has identified many 
ambiguities and constantly improved the manuscript to make it more reader-friendly.   3
a focus on solutions rather than manufacturing. The company has since the early 2000s 
experienced difficulties in making its mobile handsets business profitable. 
 
Only in 1999 information from the Ministry of Information Industry in Beijing indicated 
that domestic makers captured a miniscule 2 per cent of the market for mobile handsets. 
This share increased to about 55 per cent in 2003, a development for which companies 
like TCL, Bird, Konka and Lenovo have been responsible. This dramatic expansion over 
the past five years has its roots in China being able to enter into a global technological 
system. Many Chinese companies have entered into dynamically evolving learning 
processes where they have rapidly been acquiring manufacturing and design technologies. 
Such companies are now entering a stage where they are aggressively looking for 
resources that will enable them to become global players. 
 
The TCL-Alcatel deal coincided with the visit of Premier Wen Jiabao in France but is 
hardly related to any initiatives or direct support from the Chinese government. TCL had 
already in late 2003 signed an even more important agreement with Thomson, also in 
France, to form another joint venture in which TCL will moreover be the dominant 
partner. The new company will become the world’s largest producer of color TV. One 
year earlier TCL also bought Schneider, an ailing electronics company in Germany. TCL 
is majority partner in all mentioned new ventures and in this way the Chinese company 
has gained access to technology and well recognized brand names - Alcatel for handsets 
worldwide, RCA for TV sets in the US and Thomson in Europe. There is no doubt that 
liquid/crystal and plasma displays will eventually replace most TV sets using cathode-
ray-tubes (CRT) and TCL has declared that it will be one of the major global suppliers of 
digital TV sets. 
 
In the meantime another Chinese company is carving out a major share in the 
manufacturing of CRTs. A state-owned producer of the TV glass bulbs based in Anyang 
in the North of Henan province, Ancai Group, has done a series of aggressive merger-
and-acquisition deals in China as well as in the US. Ancai in the second half of 2003 
acquired all plant and equipment from the joint venture between Asahi Glass and Corning 
in the US. When in operation in China the transformed plant will have an annual 
production of six million glass bulbs for TV CRTs of 25 inches and larger. Ancai is 
making these daring moves when Japanese companies are hesitant to continue its 
investment in a technology that will eventually disappear. The company argues that TV 
sets with traditional CRT will for quite some time secure market shares, particularly in 
developing countries. Ancai is posed to become the world’s largest and the major 
producer of CRT glass tubes which includes a joint venture with LG-Philips located in 
the Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan province. Thus its annual production will amount to 
60 million tubes. 
 
Apparently, industrial circles in China are well aware that major technological changes 
are underway, and are looking for ways to speed up the process inside China. Creating 
brand names and acquiring technology for Chinese products can be speeded up by joining 
forces with foreign companies or outright buying of foreign companies that have 
encountered serious economic difficulties. This was the case when Beijing Oriental   4
Enterprise (BOE) in 2002 purchased the flat panel division from Hynix, formerly 
Hyundai Electronics, when creditors forced the Korean company to offload its non-core 
activities. BOE and another Shanghai company are already in advanced investment stages 
to create major manufacturing capability for flat-screen panels. 
 
BOE was in the 1950s an electronics company that was serving the military sector. It 
suffered serious financial problems in the early 1990s in its attempts to adjust in the new 
business climate that came into being after China announced its Open-Door-Policy and 
speed up the economic reform process. BOE was reorganized in 1993 – with employees 
also providing investing – and was listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1997. The 
product range has shifted from traditional electronics components to high-tech 
communications, computer and digital systems with a current focus on the new 
generation of display devices. In Beijing BOE is making a major investment in a 
production plant for flat panel displays, while SVA in Shanghai is in cooperation with 
NEC in Japan also making a similar large/scale investment.  
 
Although already successful, Chinese companies are not always commonly recognized as 
global actors. This is still the situation for China International Marine Container Group 
(CIMC), based in Shenzhen that has become a major supplier in the global market for 
marine shipping containers. Its growth has been driven by the acquisition of container 
manufacturing facilities scattered along coastal China from Dalian in the North down to 
the Pearl River Delta, including a major manufacturing facility in Shenzhen. Similar to 
most large companies in China CIMC is still state-owned but operates under stringent 
operational and financial control by group management
2. 
 
These moves are demonstrating a multi/thronged approach by companies and government 
to give China leverage and strengthen its technological position in the global market 
place which the country re-entered only in the late 1970s. China has become the 
industrial hub of the world and her products now reach every corner of the world. Foreign 
direct investment, booming export markets and a large domestic market have together 
with abundant labor and improving infrastructure been driving an explosive growth of 
manufacturing. 
 
Meanwhile, while quality is constantly going up the prices of China’s manufactured 
goods are going down. China’s terms of trade for its industrial products are much less 
favorable than was the case for Japan and Korea in their early industrialization efforts. 
China yet has to capture brainpower industries in a major way, without it will be stuck 
with low levels of added value in their exported products. 
 
 
                                                 
2 Meyer, Marshal W. & Lu Xiaohui, Managing Indefinite Boundaries: The Strategy and Structure of  a 
Chinese Business Firm, Management and Organization Review (2004) 1:1 1-30   5
Technological aspirations – Narrow Window of opportunity 
 
Lester Thurow in 1997 noted that the global economic system is simultaneously affected 
by movements of five tectonic plates: the end of communism; a technological shift to an 
era dominated by man-made brainpower industries; a demography never before seen; a 
global economy; and an era where there is no dominant economic, political or military 
power. 
 
To a great extent China has become part of this aggravating shift and is left with a narrow 
window of opportunity to again become a leading nation – a technological superpower. 
China has been living with a frustration since the industrial revolution took off in Europe 
and left the nation outside the mainstream of technological mastery where in the past only 
Japan in Asia was able to breakout out of a self-imposed straitjacket. Japan has in more 
recent times been trailed by Korea and other countries while China was contained within 
a planned economy. 
 
The industrialization of Communist China that started in the early 1950s, supported by 
the then Soviet Union, made a successful break with China’s backwardness. A substantial 
number of strategic industrial complexes were built, many of them in the Northeast 
provinces which had until 1945 been under Japanese occupation – formerly known as 
Manchuria.  However, an ideological fixation and rashness to catch up with the outside 
world led to the disaster of the Great Leap Forward. China eagerly wanted to catch up 
with Great Britain in steel production as USSR announced its goal of overtaking the US 
in this sector. The successful collectivization of agriculture in its early stages made the 
leadership believe that rural labor could easily and quickly be transferred to industrial 
production. This proved to be a grim mistake and the expected rapid industrialization 
resulted in dismal failure and most industrial products of the Great Leap Forward were 
completely useless. 
 
In an ensuing power struggle with its roots in ideology China at the times of the Cultural 
Revolution almost reached the stage of civil war. During this period China attempted 
major reforms of its innovation system, reorganized research institutes and universities; 
although with more attention to ideological dedication than results that would support the 
country’s technological and scientific modernization. The situation was further 
complicated by the real or perceived threat of a military conflict, possibly involving 
nuclear weapons, with the US that was at the time heavily involved in its war in Vietnam. 
This forced the planners in China to relocate major industries of importance for tits 
defense capabilities to the interior of China in order to reduce its vulnerability. 
 
It took until the end of the 1970s before China could anew establish its modernization 
goals; this time exploiting foreign capital and foreign technology. The process started 
modestly after the Open-Door-Policy had been announced in 1978. The size of potential 
markets in China, the seriousness of the leadership and rapidly changing economic 
conditions eventually persuaded the outside world that China was going to become part 
of the world economy. Throughout the previous period of almost 30 years Mao Zetong   6
remained until his death in 1976 the dominant political leader with at times a truly 
formidable power. He sought to change the character of the Chinese people by inspiring 
them to heroic deeds while in parallel tormenting them through his ambitious but 
unrealistic goals of quickly modernizing the nation. Still Mao remains the icon of a 
united China, where his party remains in power although almost all his policies have been 
abandoned 
 
In the meantime China in 1979 introduced a family planning program that drastically 
reduced family size with its very strong emphasis on one-child family and measures to 
ensure its success. The population would today have been 1,600 million instead of 1,300 
if China had not followed this course. However, China, like industrialized countries in 
Europe and Japan, will rapidly become an aging society and the working-age population 
will begin to shrink already around 2015. 
 
The median age of the population will climb from 32 in 2003 to around 45 in 2040. As an 
aging society China is not only facing a financial predicament as it is now evolving in 
Europe and Japan. The leadership has to cope with at least two emerging challenges. First, 
the country must get rich hurriedly in order to be able finance the costs of an aging 
population in terms of health care and other social security needs. Second, China being 
still in the stage of initial development must move swiftly to fully utilize its still young 
people to, without any delay, raise all levels of knowledge which would be required in a 
more mature industrialized society. 
 
China’s narrow window of opportunity compels it to vigorously and forcefully use 
youngish entrepreneurs, engineers and scientists to move the country to the high 
pinnacles of economic development before the population gets old and tired and has not 
only to financially be cared for. Thus, brainpower industries have to replace the labor-
intensive industries that still dominate most industrial sectors in China. Brainpower 
industries require talented people, technological ideas, advanced knowledge, 
sophisticated infrastructure, financial capital and other resources. This book offers facts 
and insights on how China is mobilizing such resources to become a technological 
superpower. 
 
The world of today has only one superpower. The US is in the early part of this century 
unchallenged in defense, economics, politics and technology. Japan can be termed a 
superpower in economics and technology. EU is conceived as a superpower in economics, 
politics and technology, while Russia has remaining strengths in defense and technology. 
Today China is a superpower in politics with an emergence in economics and great 
ambitions in technology. The process of achieving rapid technological progress and 
reaching the status of a technological superpower has been the substance of the 
deliberations of thousands of scientists, engineers and policy makers that have since early 
2003 been preparing the 2020 Science and Technology Plan
3. 
 
The 2020 Plan covers altogether twenty different but also closely related features. 
Manufacturing is one of them for which the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) has 
                                                 
3 Author interviews and Beijing conference participation, November 2003.   7
been given the mandate of coordinating views on China’s future course in industrial 
development. Basic research is naturally the responsibility of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences (CAS), while the State Defense Science and Technology Commission are 
considering China’s future in military technology. The National Research Centre for 
Science and Technology for Development (NRCSTD) is shouldered with the task of 
bringing all various opinions and views into an overall strategy for China to reach its 
ambitious goals by 2020. The Centre has also been given the special task of charting the 
course of China’s regional innovation systems (RIS) 
 
In any country, and particularly in a country like China with its extraordinary size and 
diversity, technological innovation will take place in a number of its regions that are 
becoming spatial innovation systems. External connections to other businesses, to 
component suppliers and to researchers are as important for these regions as internal ones.  
 
Regional Innovation Systems 
 
The dynamic changes that erupted from economic policies since the late 1970s have 
formed new industrial structures along China’s coastal areas and also in a major way 
transformed the economic relations between the centre and the regions/provinces. The 
regionalization that has taken place prompts us to view China as a federation of 
economies rather than a completely integrated economic entity, and similar tendencies 
can also be identified in other countries. The result is that regions interact more with 
agents from outside the country than within. These regions have become innovative with 
their own distinctive ambitions to foster their industrial dynamics and development which 
need to be supported by regional policies for institutional and structural changes – 
although also supported for by national structures. Furthermore, it has also been 
practicable for the planners to create different approaches towards innovation in some 
technology sectors for which the size of China offers more local and regional possibilities 
than would be feasible in most other regions of the world. 
 
It has for some time been possible to identify three regions in China where policies and 
structures reflect an ongoing regionalization that also includes science and technology as 
essential components. One is the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) region which includes 
Shanghai and 14 other cities in the southern part of Jiangsu Province and the northern 
part of Zhejiang Province - close to the actual river delta. The population of the YRD 
region is presently 82 million which corresponds to about 81 per cent of the population of 
the two provinces combined with Shanghai. A second distinctive region is the Pearl River 
Delta (PRD) region which includes Guangzhou (Canton) and Shenzhen, Hong Kong and 
Macao and a several closely linked cities in Guangdong province. The population of the 
PRD region is now 48 million. A third region, towards the north, still along China’s 
coastal line, less clearly defined but also very important, is the Bo-Hai Rim (BHR). This 
includes Beijing with its surrounding areas and Tianjin on the coast, parts of Hebei 
province and Qingdao, Weihai and Yantai Shandong province – with a population of 
around 80 million. These three regions share three per cent of China’s land mass and   8
have about 15 per cent of the country’s population, while generating 45 per cent of gross 
domestic product and more than 70 per cent of international trade and investment. 
 
First two regions are important hubs in China having become the manufacturing centre of 
the world. PRD and YRP have developed into the heaviest concentrations of industrial 
activities that can be found anywhere in the world. The Pearl River Delta started its race 
earlier and has reached a GDP of US$267 billion compared with US$205 billion for the 
Yangtze River Delta region - 2001. PRD is also dominating with its exports of US$195 
billion against US$74 billion for YRD – in 2001.  
 
In any attempt to understand recent and future industrial and economic development in 
China it becomes unavoidable to think about various regions as the equivalents of major 
countries in other parts of the world. In several ways the regions of the Pearl River Delta, 
the Yangtze River Delta and the Bo-Hai Rim can be compared with France, Germany and 
the UK in Europe. By world standard the regions essentially have middle-income 
purchasing power. However, income levels within the region show great discrepancies 
which reflect a multi-level industrial structure including large sectors of labor-intensive 
manufacturing. Labor resources for the continued existence of such industries within the 
regions rely on large numbers of migrant workers who in Chinese statistics are 
recognized as “the floating population”. 
 
The Facts & Figures Annual Handbook for 2003 declares that with constant development 
in China’s economy more and more people are leaving their registered permanent 
residence to seek better jobs. The State Statistics Bureau states that China’s floating 
population has exceed 120 million in 2002, although the official figure is likely to 
considerably underestimate the real numbers. 
 
Until now, still most migrant workers move within provinces while a figure of trans-
provincial floating population is only 42 million. Naturally, poor and populous provinces 
offer more migrant workers. Sichuan provides 16%, Anhui and Hunan each 10, Jiangxi 
9%, Henan and Hubei each 7% according to the officially announced numbers. The 
outflow from these six provinces makes up 59 per cent of the national trans-provincial 
floating population. Six provinces and two municipalities (Shanghai and Beijing) are the 
most attractive locations with Guangdong province absorbing 36%, Zhejiang 9%, 
Shanghai7%, Jiangsu 6%, Beijing 6% and Fujian 5% - of trans-provincial migrants. 
 
Although Guangdong province still remains the magnet for many migrant workers some 
segments of the Pearl River Delta region, and similarly other more developed regions, are 
rapidly advancing. In the late 1970s at the location of the present industrial Shenzhen 
City only a small town with some 50,000 inhabitants existed. Only one engineer was 
reported and no industrial base whatsoever existed. Shenzhen was at the time just the 
frontier of a booming Hong Kong. China’s Open-Door-Policy in 1979 completely 
changed the city conditions and Shenzhen has over the past couple of decades become a 
high-tech industrial city, with a population of seven million. 
   9
Shenzhen is today the most multicultural city in China, developing at high speed with 
great flexibility. Forty per cent of the present inhabitants come from Guangdong. The rest 
comes from Hong Kong, Taiwan and all other parts of China. The expansion of 
production has been followed by research activities in which IT companies dominate. 
Exports from Shenzhen have increased rapidly during the past ten years and today about 
one third of China’ high-tech exports originate in Shenzhen and in this respect Shenzhen 
is becoming more important than Beijing. 
 
Shenzhen’s characteristics include prominence in IT, finance and logistics. IT products 
constitute 90% of industrial output with an expected rapidly increasing share for 
biotechnology. Shenzhen companies have established a strong position in telecom 
switching equipment and in magnetic and optical reading heads. Two companies are 
looming on the horizon as serious competitors to the established European telecom 
companies like Ericsson and Siemens, US Motorola and Japanese NEC – not only in 
domestic but also in global markets. 
 
The most prominent one is the still privately-held Huawei Technologies being closely 
trailed by other domestic competitors. A second one is ZTE Corporation that when 
established in 1985 was only a simple trading company, under the name Zhongxing 
Semiconductor, having been sponsored by the No. 691 Factory under former Ministry of 
Aerospace Industry. ZTE entered the telecom sector in the early 1990s when domestic 
demand increased rapidly and management found that engineering competence inside the 
company provided a golden opportunity to enter a new and rapidly expanding industrial 
sector. In many other fields Shenzhen shows rapid advances in industrial 
technologies .For example an expansion of technological competence within innovative 
materials has driven rapid developments of production technology for new types of 
advanced high-tech batteries. 
 
Foreign companies have in the past located in Shenzhen because of labor which is not 
only attractive for cost reasons but also for its increasing competence levels.  Recently, a 
new reason for the increasing attractiveness of Shenzhen lies in its dominance of private 
companies while industry in many other Chinese cities is dominated by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). As a consequence more than 90 per cent of all R&D carried out in 
Shenzhen takes place inside the companies. Incubators have in recent years taken on a 
prominent role for which private firms are mainly responsible. The government policy is 
focused on providing finance for incubators, and a favorable institutional and legal 
framework 
 
The industrial output of Shenzhen will by 2020 – the local government states - increase 
seven-fold. The same optimism suggests that by 2020 semiconductors will become a very 
important part of the information technology structure in Shenzhen, and new materials 
and biotechnology will become leading. 
 
Probably, one of the justifications for this optimism is University Town was designated in 
December 2003 to have 10,000 students of which 70% being Shenzhen all-day students 
while the rest are “local” part-time students who study in evenings and on weekends. The   10
University Town will in particular draw on resources from Tsinghua University, Beijing 
University, Harbin Engineering University and Nankai University. Shenzhen does not 
have a well developed university structure, although University Town is part of China’s 
211 Project whereby China should have the 100 best universities in the 21
st Century. 
 
Halfway between Shenzhen and Guangzhou lies Dongguan which has a total population 
of 6.5 million of which only 1.5 million are permanent residents.  The remainder consists 
of migrant workers of which some have become semi-permanent residents. Similar to 
Shenzhen, having moved through several stages of manufacturing, technology 
development, venturing, and high-technology development, Dongguan will in the future 
emphasize industrial development of biotechnology and other high-technology fields. 
 
A first factory moved from Hong Kong (HK) to Dongguan in 1978 to start manufacture 
of handbags, soon followed by a large number of other HK firms that moved their labor-
intensive manufacturing onto the Mainland. The first companies from Taiwan moved to 
Dongguan in the mid-1980s, soon to be followed by a substantial number of electronics 
firms which created the foundation for Dongguan to gradually evolving into a high-tech 
industrial city. As a consequence Dongguan has attracted more and more high-tech 
industries – also from Europe, Japan and Singapore. Nokia started its production of 
telecom equipment here in the mid-1990s. 
 
Dongguan authorities have realized that land is overloaded with too many labor-intensive 
companies scattered throughout, which among others created environmental problems. 
Thus, a conclusion was reached by municipal authorities that industrial development, 
population and environment must be harmonized, and further industrial development 
should be concentrated only on high-tech industries with considerable restrictions on 
others. This has eventually created a Dongguan focus on industries in the electronics and 
telecommunications sectors that increased their share of industrial employment from17% 
in 1995 to 34% in 2000. As a consequence industrial production has become more 
diversified and less labor-intensive. Dongguan has in parallel been expanding and 
reorganizing its higher education and is also establishing a science and industrial park. 
Published information on Songshan Lake Science & Technical Industrial Park makes the 
following statement
4. 
Dongguan has set the strategic goal to become a modern industrial city noted for 
its manufacturing in the new millennium. It is a crucial decision to develop 
Songshan Lake Sci. & Tech. Industrial Park (SSL) aiming at achieving the goal. 
In the future development of Dongguan’s economy, as the economic and 
technological centers of this city, SSL will be the new platform for foreign 
economic and technical cooperation, the driver of upgrading the industrial 
structure, the centre of industrial supportive services.  
 
Within the three regions mentioned above China is shaping regional competence blocks – 
in other contexts referred to as regional innovation systems - which are increasingly 
interacting on a global scale, whereby China’s national innovation system sometimes 
                                                 
4 Songshan Lake Sci. & Tech. Industrial Park – Innovation Chapter; Administrative Committee Building, 
Dongguan City, Guangdong, PRC, Tel. +86 – 769 2891 228, fax: +86 – 769 2822 822; www.ssl.gov.cn   11
takes on a subordinated role. A competence block would include a set of competencies 
that are essential to successfully generate, identify, expand and exploit business ideas. 
The overwhelming concentration of shoe manufacture in Dongguan city in Guangzhou 
province offers an example of a competence block that has evolved in less than 20 years.  
Embedded competencies exist in clusters which have become endowed with synergetical 
structures of customers, inventors and innovators, entrepreneurs and industrialists. A 
competence bloc becomes fully operational, or complete, when it has a critical mass of 
activities, which attract competent actors for all its functions. Such competence blocks 
are these days coming into existence all over China. 
 
However, it would be reasonable to consider China’s late industrialization in the light of 
what took place in Europe two hundred years earlier. The industrial revolution took off in 
England in the late 1700s and swiftly crossed over to the European continent in the 
following century where it quickly embraced France and Germany also to become 
industrial powers. The industrial revolution in Europe not only created dominance on the 
rest of the world but also dramatically changed the power relations which started 
intensive rivalries among the European nations and social struggles within. The ensuing 
instability, resentment and envy contributed to the two world wars that started in Europe. 
 
China today is undergoing, to some extent, a dynamic industrialization and 
modernization process on a land area that constitutes a continent and is larger and more 
populous than Europe. Industrialization in China started earlier but the very rapid and 
dynamic process that we are now witnessing started only some twenty years ago. This 
recent industrial revolution took off in the south of China, in Guangdong with its now 
industrialized cities and has been progressing northward along the coastal line and more 
recently to the interior of China. Pulsating industrial efforts have created great disparities 
between regions and social tensions which in certain aspects replicate early 
industrialization in Europe, with the significant difference that China is one nation. 
However, uneven speed of modernization in various parts of the country challenges the 
central government to alleviate disparities and control the leading regions not to become 
too autonomous. Ways of handling disparity issues in the ongoing industrialization 
process would reveal the aptitude of the central government to handle some of the 
country’s most touchy problems. 
 
Moving up the technological ladder – Standards in Competition 
 
China’s industrial development that fuelled its success in exports has been based on 
Chinese abundant labor offered at low cost to foreign investors as well as domestic 
companies. Many and soon most of world advanced consumer electronics products would 
be manufactured in China but rarely they carry a Chinese brand name or contain 
advanced technology of Chinese origin. 
 
Standardization has in recent years become a very important element of China’s 
technology strategy.  There are basically two trends to consider - in the light of the 
tectonic shift of electronics to East Asia. One is the rising attempts to harmonize interests   12
and development among three countries in East Asia - China, Japan and Korea. It has 
become obvious that the countries in East Asia have identified common interests and a 




The other and more important trend is that China wants to establish its own technological 
platform, in as many areas as possible, in order to gain independence from foreign high-
tech companies and drastically reduce the level of license fees. Being able to establish or 
influence global standards has become very vital for national technological efforts. 
 
This situation can only be changed gradually and needs to involve both company forays 
and government initiatives. The recent emphasis on industrial standards should be seen in 
this context – although China earlier registered a success with the International 
Telecommunications Union by having its own 3G standard accepted as one of three ITU 
global standards. Today almost all DVD players, bought anywhere in the world, are 
manufactured in China using technology for which mainly Japanese companies hold the 
intellectual property rights (IPR). Chinese companies in 2003 reached an agreement with 
the Japanese IPR owners who request hefty license fees. Presently the Japanese IPR 
holders of DVD technology have persuaded most of Chinese DVD makers to pay license 
fees at the level of 4% of ex-factory price. 
 
China's IPR position is still feeble. The patent portfolio of Chinese companies in the US 
is very weak and the majority of patents granted in China - by Chinese Patent Office - are 
still held by foreign-based companies. The Chinese government wants to change this 
situation and so do domestic companies. New approaches to standards will enable a 
greater share of Chinese IPR and less license fees - and also greater possibilities to go 
globally. China has singled out a number of areas in which in wants to influence the 
process of setting international standards 
 
China wishes to establish IT standards and will use the combined forces of R&D and 
standard-setting to create changes for its IT sector in order to raise the level of 
technological development and avoid paying high license fees. Chinese companies have 
recently suffered as they have been faced with complaints from IPR holders in Japan and 
the US.  
 
Thus Chinese government is today strongly supporting the development of various  
industrial technology standards in a number of areas which include digital TV and the 
controversial Chinese (WAPI) protocol for W-LAN  that offers higher security but highly 
angered both the US and Japan.  
 
TV services in China are still analogue and cable networks are very popular. Most likely 
digital services will be introduced soon and will be distributed both over cable and 
broadcasting networks. The US standard dominates in many countries, although China 
originally decided to base itself on the EU standard and was expected to pay license fees. 
However, introduction has been delayed and presently there is no competition from the 
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outside. China would be able to choose between two different domestic approaches from 
an original array of five different ones. 
 
In December 2003 China made an announcement on its plans for WAPI and on January 1 
2004 announced that all production in China and all imports must conform to the Chinese 
WAPI standards. This made the US government angry and the US Trade Representative 
visited China for serious discussions – in February 2004. 
 
WAPI involves both security and economic concerns. A number of personal digital 
assistants (PDAs),  notebook computers and mobile handsets already have built-in WiFi, 
based on the original US standard that until recently been followed all over the world. 
Japan also shares the political and commercial concerns of the US as all Japanese 
companies buy the WiFi chipsets from US companies, where Intel has a strong position. 
 
China’s conditions was that if foreign companies want to deliver products to be sold in 
China they must conform to the WAPI standard proposed as a Chinese standard, at least 
domestically .This would require an agreement with domestic Chinese companies, 
including ZTE and Huawei, which for this technology hold strong Intellectual Property 
Rights IPRs in China. The US government is obviously very eager to delay the Chinese 
rules and persuade the Chinese government to change its requirements. A tentative 
agreement on this issue might indicate that China is buying time for its own 3G system to 
become fully operational and commercially viable before it offers licenses to mobile 
operators. 
 
Another sensitive area is open-ware software where Japan and China have common 
interests. China wants a Linux version for Chinese language. Although, China, Japan and 
Korea have different interests there are prospects for cooperation in East Asia that could 
reduce the market dominance of Microsoft. 
 
 
Creating and using brainpower – The Role of Universities 
 
The university system in particular as well as education in general has received great 
attention as a fountain well for China’s future as a knowledge-based economy. 
Universities have undergone dramatic changes in recent years and it is still too early to 
fully judge their performance, which must be assessed with regard to undergraduate 
teaching, graduates studies and research. Universities in China have until recently not 
been involved in advanced research and graduate studies were only introduced after 
major reforms started in the late 1970s. 
 
The combined effects of a rapid increase of enrollment and a major restructuring of 
universities will require several years to fully lighten the burden of such changes. The 
annual enrollment of students in regular institutions of higher education was only 
400,000 in1978 and dropped to less than 300,000 the following year which corresponded 
to about 1.5% of those entering secondary schools in the same year.   14
 
The enrollment in higher education increased rapidly after 1998 with 1,000,000 new 
students, and the intake expanded to 3.2 million in 2002 which equals ten per cent of the 
intake in secondary schools the same year. Total enrollment in Chinese universities had 
by 2002 reached more than 9 million and continues to increase. More than one third of all 
university students study engineering and including science students the share is close to 
40%, and increasing. Thus, Chinese universities will in the predictable future every year 
graduate at least one million students in science and engineering, the latter with a focus 
on electronics. 
 
The number of students enrolling as postgraduates has undergone a similar and also very 
dynamic expansion from a total intake of some 10,000 in 1978 to more than 200,000 in 
2002. The number of students having completed postgraduate degrees reached 80,000 in 
2002, with a total enrollment of 500,000 in the same year. At the same time 125,000 
Chinese were enrolled in postgraduate studies at overseas universities which shows that 
presently one out of every five Chinese postgraduate students are pursuing their studies 
abroad.  
 
In 1997 China embarked on an ambitious plan reform that should bring a number of its 
universities into world leading positions during the coming century – the National 211 
Project
6. Selection of one hundred universities is expected to create a necessary focus on 
higher education to receive special attention and favorable funding. Simultaneously many 
universities merged into more comprehensive entities and are recently governed only by 
the Ministry of Education. This is a reversal of the reform in 1952 when China adopted a 
model for higher education from the Soviet Union which led to dividing and dispersing a 
large number of units. For example School of Sciences and School of Law and Liberal 
Arts at Tsinghua University were transferred to Peking University while an opposite 
transfer was made for the Engineering School of Peking University. The result in Peking 
was that Peking University became focused on social sciences while Tsinghua after the 
reform only contained engineering departments. 
 
At the same time almost all ministries were given the direct responsibility of higher-level 
training to meet their specialized needs and established their own universities and 
colleges. For example, the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications established its own 
university by merging two departments from Tianjin University and another one from 
Chongqing University. Subsequently the ministry required four universities in different 
locations of which Beijing remained prominent. The latter has now become Beijing 
University of Post and Telecommunications (BUPT) and is like its parallel UPTs in other 
locations also under the direct control of the Ministry of Education. 
 
Merging universities in China was aimed to achieve a number of objectives, aside from 
giving the Ministry of Education full control of higher education. First, major universities 
were given the task to upgrade teaching and facilities of lower-tier colleges. Second, 
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many mergers were aimed to provide complementary strengths. Finally, the changes were 
also done to reduce staff and overall administrative costs. 
 
The Zhejiang University that came into being in 1998 was created out of the former 
Zhejiang University that was established in 1928 as University of Medicine and Zhejiang 
University of Agriculture. During the changes that took place in the early 1950s the 
School of Liberal Arts and other parts were removed from Zhejiang University to be 
included in the Zhejiang Normal College that was merged with Hangzhou University in 
1958. The present Zhejiang University is included into the list of universities in the 211 
Project and is expected, in 2017, to rank among leading universities in the world. In 2003 
there were 41,000 full-time students at Zhejiang University, including 30,000 
undergraduates, 8,000 master degree students and 3,200 PhD candidates. There are also 
nearly 38,000 students enrolled in vocational education courses. 
 
Project 211, the national program for higher education, is mainly oriented to economic 
development in China and emphasis will be given to support institutions and key 
disciplinary areas which are closely related to “pillar sectors of industry” where high-
level professional manpower is needed. Priority will be given to some 25 universities 
which have a concentration of critical disciplines. These universities, which include the 
major institutions of higher learning in Beijing and Shanghai, are expected to reach high 
international standards in both teaching and research and become models for other 
universities in China. An underlying objective is to break away from the narrow 
disciplinary orientation that existed in the former university system, to broaden the 
coverage of various disciplines and foster the emergence of cross-disciplinary teaching 
and research. 
 
The sudden increase of university training, if maintained and successful in terms of 
quality, will have two important effects – one inside China and the other one in the global 
economy. In 2002 alone, about 20 million new workers entered the employment market 
in China, but half of them had only received junior middle school education or less. 
Currently, a mere 5 percent of China's whole population has received higher education, a 
figure that is far lower than the average level in developed countries. However, the 
upsurge in higher education has had the result that students after having completed their 
university studies can no longer expect to freely choose among job opportunities and will 
see salary levels shrink compared with only a few years ago. The second consequence is 
that China will domestically offer an increasing pool of young and educated university 
graduates who will be available in a job market that already has a well developed 
industrial, technological and logistics infrastructure in many places all over China. 
Assuming that universities will continue their expansion in engineering and science at 
reasonable high quality levels China will increasingly be competing in brainpower rather 
than in labor-intensive production. 
 
An obsession with commercializing university research has apparently created a conflict 
of interest as campuses at many colleges have become cradles of entrepreneurship, and 
new technologies are being raised into business ventures at an increasing rate. A number 
of incubators have taken the form of campus-based science parks. Peking University   16
Science Park is one of these. In the past ten years, it has aided the growth of more and 
more start-ups. In 2000, 300 projects were evaluated, of which 30 were selected for 
incubation. Altogether, 400 businesses currently have operations in the park, 80 per cent 
of which are high-tech enterprises, although critiques argue that many campus companies 
have little that is high-tech about them. 
 
However, China's major universities have produced some of the best-known names in the 
technology sector. Peking University Founder Group Corp came into being in 1986 and 
now has total assets of RMB6,000 million, with shares in 17 other companies and a 
controlling stake in four listed companies. Its core business has diversified from 
developing word processing software into hardware, Internet-related products and 
systems integration. A non-profit school system and its highly specialized teaching and 
research may not always resist the temptation of the business world, and research-
obsessed scholars and market-oriented managers usually have very different perspectives.  
 
 
National Programs – National Science and Technology Policy 
 
The People’s Republic of China has throughout its history always given a great deal of 
attention to science and technology which until the early 1980s remained completely 
within the government domain. Nowadays, the corporate sector has officially taken on a 
major portion of R&D in China, although most research-intensive companies are state-
owned enterprises or maintain close links with the state sector. However, government 
programs and initiatives remain important while a private sector is growing in importance 
to fund and implement R&D. 
 
Since the beginning of the reform period China has launch five major science and 
technology programs. The first one was the Key Technologies R&D Program that was 
started in 1982 to serve the mainstream of industrial development by concentrating 
resources on technologies that were urgently needed for industrial upgrading and 
economic development – its contents evolving as the economy advanced. The next was 
the Spark Program in 1986 to develop the rural economy through science and technology 
and to initiate technological changes in village-and-town enterprises (VTE). Only a little 
later followed the High-Tech Research Development Program (863) that was launched in 
March 1987. This program coincides in time with initiatives in Japan and the EUREKA 
program in Europe that were launched in response to the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI – Star Wars Initiative) in the US. 
 
The Chinese leadership realized that China and its manufacturing units would 
increasingly face fierce international competition. The origin of the 863 program can be 
linked to a report with the title “Suggestions on Tracing the Development of World 
Strategic High Technology” – from 1986 March that gave the program its name. The 
report, written by three researchers was submitted to State Council and immediately 
submitted to Deng Xiaobing. The original report became the platform for in-depth and 
hurried deliberations and resulted in an operational report – The Report on R&D Plan on   17
High Technology. The main mission of the 863 Program was monitoring the international 
level in advanced technologies, and proposing fitting national schemes. An intermediate 
aim was reducing the gap between China and developed countries in several important 
fields and achieving breakthroughs in fields where China holds a comparative advantage.  
 
Next came the Torch Program that was launched in 1988 with the specific objective to 
develop new-technology industries in China. It was implemented by the Ministry of 
Science and Technology after approval from the State Council. The Torch Program 
included a number of activities, aside from a general mandate to provide a legal and 
organizational environment for the development of high-tech industries. First, the 
program was given the responsibility to establish new high-tech industrial development 
zones, where the objective was to convert R&D into successful industrial production. 
Second, the program is also responsible for establishing services centers to support high 
technology development. Third, the program was supposed to establish torch projects in 
high technology enterprises and enterprise groups that could successfully venture into 
areas such as new materials, biological engineering and electronics. 
 
A more recent program is the National Key Basic Research (973) Program that was 
launched in June 1997 and was designed to stimulate research that would result in 
original innovations and to provide support for future development, with a perspective on 
2010. The program is supposed to establish a number of scientific engineering projects of 
significance for long term development of the Chinese economy and society. 
 
All five programs are still operational, although their nature has been modified and the 
new projects introduced as earlier ones have been completed. The 2020 Science and 
Technology Plan to be announced towards the end of 2004 is likely to provide and 
overall framework for the all programs already mentioned. 
 
The Key Technology R&D Program of 1982 has its present focus in information 
technologies and biotechnology. The Spark Program with its attention to local economic 
development supports a large number of technical projects that use rural resources, need 
small amounts of investment, give early benefits and use appropriate technologies. The 
program is also creating demonstration zones to stimulate comprehensive regional 
development and furthermore develops regional industries that have their basis in a 
comparative advantage of regional resources. The Ministry of Science and Technology 
has the overall responsibility for the program while most management is decentralized to 
province, district and county levels. The Spark Program has attracted attention in many 
countries and its experience has been utilized by various international organizations 
including the World Bank. 
 
The National High Technology Research and Development Program of China – 863 
Program – has the aim of advance the country’s international competitiveness and 
improve overall capability of R&D in high technology. The program covers a substantial 
number of research topics which are selected from eight priority areas such as 
biotechnology, information, automation, energy, advanced materials, marine, space and 
laser fields. MOST is responsible for all areas except the last two. China officially reports   18
that its ability to join the international human genome sequencing project had its roots in 
an earlier 863 project.  
 
The Torch program under MOST has five main cores which include the creation of 
environment for the development of new high/tech industries, establishing development 
zones for such industries which should also serve as windows to the outside world, 
internationalization of such industries through cooperation with foreign partners, training 
and attracting talents to raise technology and management mastery of high tech industries, 
and support of projects which should serve as the starting point and provide the basis of 
the Torch program. Key fields include new materials, biological engineering, electronics 
and information, opto-electronics, energy-saving and environmental protection. 
 
The Basic Research Program, also known as the 973 Program is China’s ongoing national 
basic research program which came into existence in June 1997. Many of its projects 
have its roots in research activities which have initially been supported by the National 
Natural Science Foundation or other funding agencies. A major objective is to create and 
fund structures that can efficiently implement basic research into useful results that meet 
major strategic needs in China. The focus is on original innovations and to improve 
China’s capabilities in a global context, and program has singled out four major tasks. 
First, the 973 should conduct multidisciplinary research and provide scientific and 
theoretical foundations to solve important scientific issues that China is facing in the 
intermediate and long-term future. Related to this the program should engage in 
explorative research to advance the knowledge front. To meet the first two objectives the 
program is supposed to cultivate outstanding scientists who have creative capability and 
who can tackle challenging research tasks. Finally the 973 program is also responsible for 
the creation of interdisciplinary research centers responsible to carry on projects of high 
national priority. 
 
The 973 program not only absorbs the largest investment ever made by the central 
government in research and development but also includes some of the country’s largest 
R&D projects, outside the defense and space sectors. MOST that is managing the 
program suggests that its implementation has had a remarkable impact on the scientific 
and technological community in China and greatly boosted the rapid improvement of 
China’s international competitiveness. The program has in a major way involved senior 
researchers belonging to the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) and the Chinese 
Academy of Engineering (CAE), and also encouraged overseas Chinese researchers to 
join many projects. The program has also provided post-graduate training for a large 
number of students. 
 
Previous projects have included material research on carbon nanometer pipe arrays. 
Ongoing research includes the basic study of super-high-density, super-high-speed 
optical information storage and processing, and basic research of novel devices and novel 
processes of system on chip (SOC). The objective of this project is to solve the basic 
problems of device structure, device modeling and simulation, key process and reliability 
for semiconductors that realize features in the range of 20-50 nanometers. The long-term   19
ambition and expectations is that China will take a leading position not only in the 
manufacture of advanced semiconductors but also in their further development. 
 
These five programs are to develop different parts of the Chinese economy and provide 
support and funds at various levels of scientific and technological sophistication. Such 
national programs in China, as well as in any other country, undergo changes and 
naturally encounter obstacles and failures. However, there is little doubt that they have 
made a great contribution to the reform of R&D system in China which is still not 
completely transformed from the straitjacket of the earlier planned-economy times. In 
this process big programs have created new interfaces among various sectors of the 
economy and between research institutes for which CAS still plays a dominant role in 
major fields of basic research. 
 
However, there can be no doubt that technology will for some time continue to play a 
dominant role in China’s S&T strategy which was outlined in 2003 in a speech by 
Chinese Minister of Science and Technology
7. At the time he stated that China should 
follow seven major development strategies to become successful in the 21
st century. 
 
First, China should adopt a leaping development strategy to accelerate its competitiveness 
in IT industries by developing new operational systems with associated software 
platforms and advanced CPU chips. In biotechnology China should focus on functional 
genome, bioinformatics, bioengineering medicine, and biogenetic seed breeding – to be 
recognized in the international biomedical industry. Second, China should boost its 
capacity for original innovation and move away from the country’s earlier emphasis on 
copying proprietary innovations and establish evaluation systems that support this 
objective. Third, China should improve its capability to integrate and manage National 
R&D resources, and national S&T programs should have an explicit emphasis on 
disciplinary and interagency cooperation with a focus on the development of products 
and industries. 
 
Fourth, China should speed up its high-tech industrialization that will include the reform 
in national high-tech parks, supporting small and medium enterprises and providing 
needed support services. 
 
Fifth, China will use IT to support the industrialization process which should develop and 
diffuse high performance computer environment, and create common information 
technology systems particularly in areas such as banking, insurance and manufacturing. 
 
Sixth, China will promote international S&T cooperation and provide support for Chinese 
scientists to actively participate in global large-scale science projects, and encourage 
multinational companies to invest in R&D, and using imported technology and personnel 
closely integrated with FDI that has in the past played such an important role in China’s 
economic development. 
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Finally, China will improve its human resources strategy to establish a system which is 
open, competitive and giving more weight to personnel costs in the total R&D 
expenditure. China will be paying more attention to the development of human resources 
and will enhance the import of top notch people from overseas on a selected basis. 
 
Global Rivalry – Competition and Cooperation 
China has become a major player in global trade and its comparative advantage in a 
number of industrial sectors has given its manufacturers a dominant position for a 
number of goods. China’s industrial advantage lies in its almost unlimited supply of low-
cost labor with increasingly higher technical skills that has become available in a large 
number of clusters, particularly in coastal areas. These clusters are served by good 
transportation, telecommunications and logistics services which enable close and efficient 
interaction with global markets. 
 
Although China still enjoys a strong comparative advantage in the manufacture of more 
traditional labor-intensive products, more striking is the country’s large-scale entry as the 
foremost supplier of almost all electronics goods. This includes not only traditional color 
TV, and household appliances but also DVD players, notebook computers and mobile 
handsets. The role of China’s manufacturers was initially limited to final assembly for 
which low-cost high-skilled labor was a key factor while most components were 
imported, but it is likely to change in quite foreseeable future. 
 
The rapid entry of China into the world trade system to become a major supplier of 
shoes/garments and electronics is forcing other countries to change their export strategies. 
This has become very evident, particularly in developing countries that have realized that 
they must rapidly adjust to a situation that is undergoing constant change. However, 
effects are also reaching industrialized countries where we can see an earlier comparative 
advantage in advanced components and subsystems being eroded. Chinese companies are 
moving up the ladder of industrial competencies in a growing number of technological 
fields. 
 
The benefit is coming from being embedded in clusters, or competence blocks, that are 
not only closely linked locally, but also throughout the country and internationally. This 
phenomenon is also fuelled by decisions of multinational companies that are lured to 
locate more of value-added production in China, being attracted not only by manual labor 
but also by brainpower available at low costs. A further attraction lies in the rapidly 
expanding domestic market. As a result increasingly large shares of production chains for 
advanced products are being transferred to China. This is causing serious concern in 
Taiwan, Korea and Japan that fear that their economies will soon suffer from serious 
industrial hollowing-out, and recently such concerns have also been raised in the US. 
 
China has, as a developing country, has become a natural site not only for final assembly 
but also for manufacturing parts. However, large international companies usually control 
the final production into complete sets of advanced equipment. This process would 
previously for most advanced and heavy machinery been totally integrated in one   21
physical location, almost always in an industrialized country. The dissolution of 
integrated production processes - not only for electronics products - has greatly facilitated 
the entry of companies in China to get involved. Chinese companies are thereby 
acquiring skills and technology by expanded participation in the production of large scale 
equipment for global markets. 
 
At the same time China’s rate of economic development has remained high year after 
year. A favorable budget situation has enabled the government to fund a number of 
foresighted programs in science and technology. Although not always successful they 
have in many fields acted as catalysts and contributed to lifting the country out of its 
earlier technological backwardness. More and more Chinese companies, although still 
few in numbers, have become research-intensive and will soon challenge competitors in 
global markets. As a consequence industrialized countries no longer see China as a 
challenger from the developing world but increasingly as a competitor. There are 
prospects, however, that China may become potential collaborator in many fields of 
advanced science and technology. 
 
Since the late 1990s the United States has with increasing concern been watching China’s 
strategies and progress in both civilian and military science and technology. It appears 
that the European Union has come to view China strategically less as a competitor and 
more as a collaborator for a number of advanced technologies. Korea and Japan and other 
countries perceive their economies to become increasingly integrated with China and 
have with mixed feelings been prompted to further advance their scientific and 
technological prowess to stay ahead of China. 
 
There is little doubt nowadays that US-China relations are undergoing structural and 
fundamental changes. China has been able to achieve much more rapid development of 
industrial capabilities than any other developing country. The apparent ability of the 
Chinese economy to quickly and efficiently integrate various strands of technological 
inputs is not only advancing its commercial success but also enables China to radically 
improve its defense technologies. Underlying this change is an expanding and open 
market for R&D required in high-tech industries and an increasing willingness of foreign 
companies to make substantial R&D investments in China. 
 
At a US Congress hearing in the autumn of 2003 the following factors were highlighted
8. 
First, the driving force behind the globalization of R&D is the need for commercial 
ventures to increase the value-added for goods and services. Thus, design as well as R&D 
is often most efficiently done in close proximity to production bases. This provides a 
strong impetus to move R&D to follow production, although advanced and basic research 
is generally maintained within the home base. 
 
Second, multinational companies no longer limit their R&D investments to industrialized 
countries in Europe and Asia. During the past couple of years China has in this respect 
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taken on a prominent role offering a number of attractive sites for R&D investment. 
Third, the ongoing revolution in information communications has made IT technologies 
all-pervasive. This has given global companies an almost unrestricted choice of locations 
for sophisticated technologies and drastically reduced the hurdles of locating in China the 
manufacture of technologically complex products, including R&D. China has in an 
impressive way taken good advantage of these international dynamically evolving assets 
that have become available during the past few years. 
 
Too often repeated China has also benefited from its future enormous market potential 
and its policies and programs to capture the emerging global possibilities. By expanding 
its human resources and identifying “pillar industries” for the future China has become 
exceptionally well-positioned to exploit the global dynamics in research and development. 
 
China in October 2003 successfully completed its first manned space flight and 
subsequently announced that the country will undertake major efforts in space research 
and development. This came as no surprise to the world as China had for a number of 
years given great publicity to its space efforts. However, China’s space efforts and the 
success of its first manned space flight is likely to have given an additional boost to the 
US decision to announce in January 2004, ahead of the State of the Union address by the 
President, a moon colony plan. The objective is to establish a permanent human 
settlement on the moon and to set a goal of eventually sending Americans to Mars. 
 
China has announced that it aims to launch 10 satellites in 2004 while preparing for its 
second manned spaced flight. Although not specifically singled out in relation to China 
apparently the US wants to maintain a lead, and a Senate hearing includes the following 
statement
9. “US policymakers must not sacrifice funding for science and technology to 
other priorities such as homeland security; both are essential to long-term US national 
security interests. Funding levels must also increase over time if the United States is to 
remain economically, technologically, and militarily competitive.” 
 
The hearing statement argues that China has greatly benefited from the globalization 
process which has rapidly opened up new sources of technology and facilitated 
technology transfer to create an advanced industrial and knowledge-based economy, in 
considerably less time than under circumstances that existed only a few decades ago. 
Thus, it is stated that “the challenge it poses for US policymakers is not how to prevent 




China – A Knowledge Economy 
Every month a book is appearing in China, Japan and the West that tries do portray China 
as a future knowledge-based economy. All of them testify that economic growth has been 
remarkable over the past decades with an annual average of close to 10 per cent. They 
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also mention that half of China’s high-technology exports include not only consumer 
electronics but also computers, telecommunications and office equipment for which 
China is presently highly reliant on imported electronic components. This thriving trade 
in high-technology has a strong basis in a large number of multinational enterprises that 
operate large-scale affiliates in China. An OECD report tells that foreign affiliates of 
multinational enterprises located in China, show low turnover per employee compared 
with foreign affiliates in Singapore or Hong Kong. This would indicate that 
multinationals are still using China for the production of low-technology goods
11. 
 
Any nation desiring to become a knowledge-based economy must in crucial ways 
develop its human resources and provide infrastructures to fully exploit the talents within 
its borders. China has during the past ten years dramatically increased the number of 
students in tertiary education and provided more funding for R&D, not only in absolute 
terms but also in relation to its GDP. Traditional indicators, such as patents, still suggest 
that China is far from reaching its goal of becoming a knowledge-based economy. 
However, using signs of dynamic changes within industrial sectors and emerging 
competencies in a number of research fields brings forward a more encouraging scene. 
 
In many locations in China one can find an environment with young and mobile 
entrepreneurs, a multicultural mixture of people drawn from different parts of China, 
overseas Chinese, and visitors from a number of countries. Whatever direction China 
chooses for its national structure of S&T its future in R&D management lies in its 
entrepreneurial urban middle class for which the government must create good 
institutions, resources and infrastructure.  
 
The participation in a global innovation system (GIS) has recently become highly 
appraised. It shows itself for example in the increasingly close relations with the 
European science community. China has reached an agreement to become a full member 
of the Galileo Project. This is carried out within the 6
th Framework Program and will 
involve close collaboration with the European Space Agency giving China access to 
future advanced satellite technology and systems. Another example is China’s decision in 
2003 to become a full member of the ITER fusion project, which has even created a 
geopolitical conflict as China, Russia and EU opted for France as the location for the 
major ITER laboratory while the US, that joined the project after China decided to 
become a member, has strongly argued that Japan should be given this responsibility. 
 
China in a limited number of areas has clearly demonstrated its capability in Advanced 
Technology Industries (ATI) which reflects spillover effects from defense programs, 
although now supported through civilian initiatives of a nationwide character. The 
nation’s strength in labor-intensive industries (LII) is continuously demonstrated to the 
rest of the world. However, China still remains weak in industrial sectors such as 
semiconductors – not only in advanced manufacturing facilities but also in the 
development of such as devices and many other advanced components that are needed in 
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basically all kinds of electronics products. China’s share of world’s software engineers is 
still miniscule although China will soon deliver some 50 per cent of the world’s 
consumer electronics products. 
 
Thus China needs a much stronger basis in technology-intensive industries (TII) and aims 
to achieve this through its manpower development combined with TTI infrastructure and 
strong national efforts to develop innovative technologies. If realized we will in the 
intermediate future recognize a China that might simultaneously show extraordinary 
strength in ATI, LII and TII. This would categorically challenge the “flying geese pattern 
of development” where latecomer nations would just follow the leaders and only 
gradually move up the chain of technological sophistication. China might upset our 
concept of structural transformation by concurrently being able to compete on all fronts. 
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